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Abstract: Among the access control methods for database security, there
is Mandatory Access Control (MAC) model in which the security level is
set to both the subject and the object to enhance the security control.
Legacy MAC models have focused only on one thing, either
confidentiality or integrity. Thus, it can cause collisions between security
policies in supporting confidentiality and integrity simultaneously. In
addition, they do not provide a granular security class policy of subjects
and objects in terms of subjects' roles or tasks. In this paper, we present
the security policy of Bell_LaPadula Model (BLP) model and Biba model
as one complemented policy. In addition, Duties Separation and Data
Coloring (DSDC)-MAC model applying new data coloring security
method is proposed to enable granular access control from the viewpoint
of Segregation of Duty (SoD). The case study demonstrated that the
proposed modeling work maintains the practicality through the design of
Human Resources management System. The proposed model in this study
is suitable for organizations like military forces or intelligence agencies
where confidential information should be carefully handled. Furthermore,
this model is expected to protect systems against malicious insiders and
improve the confidentiality and integrity of data.
Keywords: Mandatory Access Control (MAC), SoD-driven Access
Control, Data Coloring Access Control, Security Key Authorization,
Complemented BLP and Biba Model

Introduction
In the Emerging Cyber Threats Report 2015
published by Georgia Tech, the attack of rogue insiders
was pointed out as one of emerging cyber threats.
Security incidents caused by malicious insiders bring
about significant damage to companies, but solutions are
not easy at all. To address such evolving threats from
insiders, it is necessary to develop stronger access
control technologies to detect anomalous behaviors. Due
to the dynamics and uncertainty of the current network
environment, access control is one of the most important
factors in guaranteeing network information security.
How to construct a scientiﬁc and accurate access control
model is a current research focus. In actual access
control mechanisms, users with high trust values bring

better beneﬁts, but the losses will also be greater once
cheating access is adopted (Wang et al., 2019).
Earlier studies on access control can be grouped into
three categories. First, some studies focus on controlling
subjects (users, etc.) such as Discretionary Access
Control (DAC) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
(Bertino, 2003; Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992; Kuhn et al.,
2010; Sandhu et al., 1996; 2000; United Nations, 2004),
while some are about the expansion of such methods
(Bertino et al., 2005; Kalinin et al., 2018; Sinha et al.,
2018; Zhao and Chen, 2013) Second, techniques such as
masking (Mansfield-Devine, 2014), digital watermarking
(Kumar, 2019), image fusion (Gupta and Kumar, 2019)
and encryption (Davida et al., 1981; Elovici et al., 2004)
are aiming at strengthening the security of objects such
as data. Third, those that consider both subjects and
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objects include Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
These methods, however, do not have clear and concrete
security policies on access control for objects that indeed
should have been protected primarily. Especially,
existing MAC models have focused only on one thing,
either confidentiality or integrity. Thus, it can cause
collisions between security policies in supporting
confidentiality and integrity simultaneously. The
collision problem of security policy between the BLP
and Biba models is shown in Fig. 5. In addition, since
access control policies between subjects and objects at
the same security level have not been subdivided to
define them specifically, it has been difficult to maintain
confidentiality and integrity. Even though the LatticeBased Access Control (LBAC) model (Sandhu, 1993)
showed that BLP model (Bell and LaPadula, 1975) and
Biba model (Biba, 1997) emphasizing only
confidentiality and integrity can be mathematically
accommodated in a lattice in terms of information flow,
but it was not address that the opposite policy between
their models can be complemented into one security
policy. In addition, it has not been able to create policies
for granular security classes of sub-jects and objects in
terms of subjects' roles or tasks.
Therefore, the vision or aim of this paper is to solve
both the collision between security policies of BLP
model and Biba model in order to guarantee
confidentiality and integrity at the same time (Fig. 6). To
do this, we present a complementary policy for BLP
model and Biba model security policy, but we have
studied a model that can provide granular access control
in terms of Separation of Duty (SoD).
In order to address the ambiguity (collision) issue of
security access control policies, this study presents a
DSDC-MAC model that is developed using the principle
of SoD and a data coloring technique. Based on the
policies of the suggested model, at the aspect of tasks of
users and objects are separated (integrity) and such
classified individual subjects and objects are given
certain colors according to their security level
(confidentiality). In turn, the colors are matched with
security keys (refer Fig. 8 and Fig. 9) to permit subjects
to access or not to access objects (or data). In addition,
detailed access control using SoD is enabled for security
policies between subjects and objects with equivalent
security level that previous studies have not suggested.
Moreover, security can be strengthened in terms of
subject and object mapping through the mechanism of
granting and assigning access rights using security keys.
As shown in Fig. 1, according to the proposed
concepts and principles above, the approach process for
designing the DSDC-MAC model (Fig. 1) is as follows:







The supplemented MAC model (CBB model:
Complemented BLP and Biba model) by adding
Separation of Duties policy is refined
A security architecture based on the CBB model is
designed and a detailed access control technique
using SoD and Data coloring in detail is defined
The security keys for matching between subject and
object are specified to control user’s access to
objects
A case studies and evaluations are discussed

Next Section analyzes the access control models from
relevant studies. After that, following Section addresses
the DSDC-MAC model using SoD and data coloring.
Next Section presents the application case of the
proposed model for a Human Resources Management
System (HRMS). Then, next Section compares the
existing models with the proposed one.

Relevant Studies
In this section, the characteristics and limitations
of the MAC model among various access control
models that have been studied to explain the direction
and research purpose of this study are described.
Next, the differences between the terminology being
used in this article and the terminology of data
coloring proposed in the legacy study and separation
of duties are explained. Finally, the existing research
methods for DB security are outlined.

Access Control Model
MAC is a model to control individual owners of
objects. The centralized authority determines who should
be granted access to what kinds of information and
general users are unable to change access authority.
Under this principle, MAC models (Kalinin et al., 2018),
which determine access control rules by centralized
security rules, guarantee data confidentiality and
integrity that are not maintained in DAC systems that
Owner decides on access control rules. However, it is
difficult to determine security levels suitable for subjects
and objects in advance and also not easy to apply.
Among the MAC-based models, BLP model, Biba
models and LBAC models are representative.
Focusing on confidentiality, the BLP prevents
information from flowing from a higher security level
to a lower security level. As shown in Fig. 2, the BLP
model has two policies (No-read-up Policy and Nowrite-down Policy).
The BLP model allows high security subjects to
read, but not write, objects of the same or lower level.
Conversely, a low secure subject can write, but cannot
read, objects of the same or higher level. In other

The security requirements are first redefined
The existing BLP and Biba models are complemented each other
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security access class of subjects and objects. If a subject
at a lower security is allowed to alter objects at higher
security levels, the original reliability of data can be
compromised as it is combined with less reliable
information. The Biba model has No-read-down and Nowrite-up Integrity Policies.

words, although the confidentiality is emphasized so
that a low security subject can’t steal high-level data,
it has a problem in terms of integrity that a low
security subject can manipulate high-level documents.
On the contrary, as shown in Fig. 3, the Biba model
(Biba, 1997) focusing on integrity is based on the
* CBB: Complemented BLP
and Biba model

Solution success policy

Complemented
policy

BLP model

Separation of duties
policy

Biba model

1. CBB policy model
MAC policy model rebuilding

2. CBB policy-based duties separation and data coloring MAC model:
DSDC-MAC
Solution access model,
technique, service

 Confidentiality
service
 Integrity service

Access control policy based on
duties separation and data coloring
DSDC-MAC modeling
based on data-coloring and
separation of duties policy

Security key matching
Subject-object matching
by color and task (duties)

Authority-based access control

3. Case study of DSDC-MAC model
Solution model demonstration

Case study and evaluation

DSDC-MAC model design with human resource management system

4. Analysis and comparison
Analysis of case study

Comparison with exiting model

Fig. 1: Approach process for designing the DSDC-MAC model
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Fig. 2: Security policy of BLP model
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Fig. 3: Security policy of Biba model

data by linking objects in systems to systems in the real
world in Clark and Wilson (1987).
SoD literally means “separating authority” from a
perspective of “subjects.” To execute a task, its authority
is separated and multiple people cooperate together
doing their duties. From a perspective of data (objects),
however, it is required to classify the objects into smallscale tasks to apply the SoD principle to them. This
study suggests more segmented access control methods
to secure integrity by classifying tasks classification
criteria of objects into more segmented and small-scale
data to apply SoD.

The Biba model has a policy opposite to BLP model
in Fig. 2. That is, a high security subject can use the
same or lower class objects but cannot read them.
Conversely, a low secure subject can read an equivalent
or higher level object, but cannot write. In other words,
it emphasizes integrity so that subjects with low
security level cannot manipulate high-level documents,
but rather, it is a model that has a problem in
confidentiality that a low-security subject can steal
high-level documents.
The LBAC model (Sandhu, 1993; Denning, 1976) is
one of the most common models among the MAC
models. To specify the multi-layer security policy, the
dominate relation between the security levels and use
lattice to specify the order is defined. In front, we
mentioned the limitations of the security policy of BLP
model and Biba model emphasizing only confidentiality
and integrity respectively. Although it has been shown
through several examples that each model can be
mathematically accommodated within a lattice in terms
of information flow, but it is not clear that the opposite
of two models can be complemented into one policy.

Data Coloring
The word, data coloring (Ceze et al., 2008), was first
introduced as a technique to apply to programming
models. Programmers select certain points and assign
colors to them in a control flow in which the consistency
of data needs to be secured. This was proposed as a
programming model to control access simultaneously
through data coloring. A new data coloring technique in
Hwang and Li (2010) was suggested as a color matching
technique to identify data and users. For the new
technique, watermarking mechanism and fuzzy logic were
used for cloud computing environments. In Liu et al.
(2011), the data coloring technique suggested in
Hwang and Li (2010) was applied as a cloud watermarking model and presented test results. In Sudha and
Jamuna (2013), a cloud watermarking model using
secure RSA algorithm was suggested as a regular
authorization method. In other words, data coloring
models that were presented in Hwang and Li (2010),
Liu et al. (2011) and Sudha and Jamuna (2013) used
software watermarking technology to allow the 1:1
access control between Subject (S) and Object (O) when
sensitive data had to be shared in cloud environments.
Given that, earlier data coloring techniques are not
suitable to classify levels of confidentiality as well as
hierarchical authority levels of subjects and objects in
this study.

Separation of Duties (SoD)
Headings SoD (Botha and Eloff, 2001) is a method
for internal control associated with the execution of
tasks. One task is divided into several duties and the
duties are executed by multiple people to complete the
task. This is designed to prevent any abuse of
authority or mistakes that may occur in business
processes. This concept (Botha and Eloff, 2001;
Moon et al., 2004) started as a design principle for
data protection in conventional computer systems and
it has been defined as a requirement for various access
control models including RBAC model. SoD was
defined as separation of privilege in Saltzer and
Schroeder (1975) among 8 design principles for the
protection of information systems and it was also
defined as a mechanism to guarantee the integrity of
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Fig. 4: Legacy methods of DB security

In order to address collision issues between policies
found in MAC models such as BLP and Biba, techniques
of Separation of Duties and data coloring are used in this
study. Through this method, this study aims to suggest a
DSDC-MAC model that can provide more segmented
access controls to users (subjects) and data (objects). In
doing so, security keys are used as an authorization
means for subjects and objects. To do this, this section
defines the access control policies of MAC models and
proposes security architecture of DSDC-MAC model
and finally specifies access control technique based on
SoD and data coloring.

shown in Fig. 5, collisions between the access control
policies of the two models occur inevitably.
The No-read-up Policy of the BLP model protects the
confidentiality of higher-level secrets by preventing
lower security levels from reading higher-level secrets.
On the other hand, the Biba model prevents users at
higher security levels from reading objects at lower
security levels. General concepts of these access control
policies are to prevent anything that are clearly not
allowed and to allow anything that are clearly not
prevented. Based on these concepts, the No-read-up
Policy of the BLP model potentially means “possibleread-sibling and down.” In other words, this means that
reading objects at the same level or lower levels is
allowed. Therefore, this exactly collides with the Noread-down Policy of the Biba model. In addition, the Nowrite-down Policy of the BLP model potentially means
“possible-write-sibling and up.” Again, this means that
writing objects at the same level or higher levels is allowed. Therefore, this exactly collides with the Nowrite-up Policy of the Biba model.
Collisions between the policies of the BLP and the
Biba models occur in the following cases.

Complemented Policy Model for Solving Policy
Collision: CBB

Case 1. BLP Model "No-Read-Up" Policy ⇔ Biba
Model "No-Read-Down" Policy

Security Policy Collision between the BLP and
Biba Models

For instance, if there are some personnel who have the
2nd grade (Secret) authority in an organization, according
to the BLP model policy, they can read the 2nd grade
(Secret) and the 3rd grade (Confidential) information, but
they are not allowed to read the 1st grade (Top Secret)
information. According to the Biba model, however, the
personnel can read the 2nd grade (Secret) and 1st grade
(Top Secret) information, but they are not allowed to read
the 3rd grade (Confidential) information. In this case, a

Legacy Methods of DB Security
As shown in Fig. 4, earlier studies on the security of
Database (DB) can be grouped into Subject-Oriented
Methods (SOMs), Object-Oriented Methods (OOMs)
and Multilevel Security (MLS) methods that combined
the two types.

SoD and Data Coloring based MAC Model:
DSDC-MAC

The BLP model, one of the most representative
MAC models, focuses on confidentiality, while the
Biba model puts focus on securing integrity. If
confidentiality and integrity need to be guaranteed
simultaneously, all of the policies of the two models
should be satisfied at the same time. In this case, as
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question emerges like whether the personnel who have the
2nd grade (Secret) authority should be allowed to read
Top Secrets in the Biba model and this arises from
“confidentiality.” In other words, there is a contradiction
in the “No-read-down” Policy of the Biba model from the
perspective of confidentiality.

its task range. Even subjects who have higher-level
authority should be also prevented from discretionarily
accessing objects at lower levels out of their task range.
Assumptions for security to meet these requirements
are as follows:


Case 2. BLP Model "No-Write-Down" Policy ⇔
Biba Model "No-Write-Up" Policy



Like Case 1, if there are some personnel who have
the 2nd grade (Secret) authority, according to the BLP
model policy, they can write the 2nd grade and the 1st
grade information, but they are not allowed to write
the 3rd grade information. According to the Biba
model, however, the personnel who have the 2nd
grade authority can write the 2nd grade and 3rd grade
information, but they are not allowed to write the 1st
grade information. Again, a question emerges like
whether the personnel who have the 2nd grade
(Secret) authority should be allowed to write Top
Secrets in the Biba model and this arises from
“integrity.” In other words, there is a contradiction in
the “No-write-down” Policy of the BLP model from
the perspective of integrity.




Complementary BLP and Biba Policy Model: CBB
Policy Model
To meet the requirements discussed in above
section, access control policies based on the MAC
model are redefined as follows. In particular, the
security policy rule for Req. 3 should be derived from
the perspective of SoD, one of the basic principles for
information security.

Requirements and Assumptions of Security Policy
In order to address such collision issues between
policies of the BLP and Biba models and to guarantee
both confidentiality and integrity, requirements for
security policies should be defined as follows:




Rule 1: (No-Read/Write-Up Policy, * Simple Security
Property) [Derived from Req. 1 and 2]
A subject who has lower-level authority is prevented
from accessing objects at higher levels. A subject who
has higher-level authority can access objects at the same
level or lower levels. Allowing subjects at lower levels
to read objects at higher levels raises confidentiality
issues. In addition, allowing subjects at lower levels to
write objects at higher levels violates integrity. This
policy protects both confidentiality and integrity by
preventing subjects who do not have access authority
from accessing objects.

Req. 1. Subjects who have higher-level authority can
access objects at the same lev el and lower levels
Req. 2. Subjects who have lower-level authority
should not be allowed to access higher-level objects
Req. 3. Subjects should be prevented from accessing
secretes unrelated to their task

This means that in a relationship between a subject
and object at the same level, a subject should be
prevented from discretionarily accessing an object out of
BLP model

Ass. 1. If a subject is allowed to read an object at a
higher level than its security level, confidentiality is
violated
Ass. 2. If a subject is allowed to write an object at a
higher level than its security level, integrity is
violated
Ass. 3. In an ordinary organization, users are not
allowed to handle secret information unrelated to
their task
Ass. 4. In an ordinary organization, a subject who
has higher-level authority assumes all the authority
of subjects at lower levels

Biba model
Semantic
collision
occurring

No-read-up policy

No-write-up policy

No-read-down policy

No-write-down policy

* Confidentiality-oriented approach

* Integrity-oriented approach

Fig. 5: Security policy collision between the BLP and Biba models

77

Soon-Book Lee et al. / Journal of Computer Science 2020, 16 (1): 72.91
DOI: 10.3844/jcssp.2020.72.91

Biba model

BLP model
Confidentiality-up

Integrity-up

No-read-up policy

No-write-up policy

No-write-down policy

No-read-down policy

Confidentiality and Integrity-up
No-read/write-sibiling policy

Separation of duties

Fig. 6: Enhanced CBB policy model for solving policy collision between BLP and Biba model

Rule 2: (No-Read/Write-Sibling Policy, * Separation of
Duties Property) [Derived from Req. 3]

[Contradiction]


“Sibling” is a word for “brother or sister” or “those
having parents in common.” In this study, siblings mean
subjects and objects at the same security level and their
tasks are classified based on the Rule 1. A subject at a
certain level can access objects allowed within the same
task category. It cannot access objects at higher levels
even within the same task category as defined in Req. 1,
but it can access objects at lower levels.
An enhanced CBB policy model for access control is
shown in Fig. 6. This is based on the BLP and Biba
models and coupled with SoD, this model can maintain
confidentiality and integrity. This model combines the
priority policy for confidentiality in the BLP model and
that for integrity in the Biba model. By doing so, it is
possible to exclude policies that cause collisions between
the two models and to map the priority policies with the
policies derived from the SoD principle. In other words,
in terms of confidentiality, it prevents unauthorized
subjects from accessing higher level objects for “read”
and in terms of integrity, it prevents unauthorized
subjects from accessing higher level objects for “write”.
That is why it drives to provide and improve the
confidentiality and integrity and at the same time. In
particular, at the same level, access is granted by
classifying subjects and objects in detail by separation of
duties. Thus, even at the same level, access to “read” and
“write” can be denied without permission, further
enhancing confidentiality and integrity.
As discussed in Cases 1 and 2, contradictions in
terms of confidentiality and integrity are found in the
existing BLP and Biba models. The CBB policy model
suggested in this study addresses such issues and the
explanation for the solutions is as follows:




Cont. 1. The “No-read-down” Policy of the Biba
model has a contradiction in terms of confidentiality
Cont. 2. The “No-write-down" Policy of the BLP
model has a contradiction in terms of integrity
Cont. 3. Each policy of the BLP and Biba model has
a contradiction in terms of both confidentiality and
integrity between subjects and objects within the
same level

[Explanation]
Confidentiality is a feature to prevent subjects, who
have no authority or have lower-level authority, from
accessing data to be protected. The “No-read-down”
Policy of the Biba model in Cont. 1 means “Possibleread-up" and gives subjects at lower levels authority to
read objects at higher levels. Therefore, Cont. 1 violates
confidentiality.
Integrity is a feature to prevent subjects, who have
no authority or have lower-level authority, from
accessing and altering data to be protected. The “Nowrite-down" Policy of the BLP model in Cont. 2 means
"Possible-write-up" and gives subjects at certain levels
authority to write objects at higher levels. Therefore,
Cont. 2 violates integrity.
In Cont. 3, the “No-read-down” Policy of the Biba
model means “Possible-read-sibling.” The “No-writedown” Policy of the BLP model means “Possible-writesibling.” Therefore, a subject at a certain level cannot be
classified by tasks. In other words, Cont. 3 violates both
confidentiality and integrity since access authority for
reading and writing is allowed to multiple objects at the
same level. By separating duties for subjects and object
at the same level, access can be controlled.
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The CBB Policy model, under the ”No-read/writeup" rule, does not allow subjects at certain levels to
access (read/write) objects at higher levels at all. In
addition, by separating duties for subjects and object at
the same level, access can be controlled. Therefore, the
suggested policy addresses contradictions that the
existing models have.

* Rule description: A specific upper level subject (S)
having a specific task (tn) is accessible to an equal level
and a lower level object (O) of a specific job (4).
However, the lower level subject (S) having the specific
task (tn) is that the access is limited to upper level object
(5) and if the task is different even if it is a higher level,
it means that it is not possible to access to object of the
same and lower level (6).

[Formal Definition]

Duties Separation and Data Coloring based MAC
Model: DSDC-MAC

The formal definition of the CBB policy to
accommodate Rule1 and Rule2 derived above is as follows:
When and only when the security level SL(S) of a
subject 'S' dominates or equal to the security level
SL(S) of an object 'O' and the duty (task and/or
sub_task) of a subject 'S' equal to the task of an object
'O', the subject 'S' has the “read/write/append/delete”
access to the object 'O'.
Security Level (SL) consists of Upper Security Level
(USL), Lower Security Level (LSL) and Sib-ling
Security Level (SSL) and can have 1 to n security levels:
SL  USL, LSL, SSL and SL1, SL2,    SLn

As shown in Fig. 7, the security structure of the
Duties Separation and Data Coloring (DSDC)-MAC
model is mainly composed of security level policy;
separation of duties policy; data coloring rules and the
relationship among subject, security key and object are
applied to. For strict authorization, access has to go
through the first authorization process based on Id
(identification) and Password and the second
authorization process based on security key to directly
apply access control policies and additionally certify
access. Security Key (SK) serve as a medium to link
between a subject and an object. In the processes of
security key authority and delegation policy, the
security keys of individual subjects are authorized and
assigned and users at the relevant security level can
delegate security keys to others. Simple security
property and separation of duties property, as
complementary BLP and Biba model (CBB) policies,
address collision issues between policies that were
found in earlier studies in terms of confidentiality and
integrity. They are also reflected in access control
policies to ensure a subject can access an object while
maintaining confidentiality and integrity.

(1)

The level or degree of access permission defines as
Security Level Function: f(x), The USL function: fu, the
LSL function: fl and the SSL function: fs. The access
permission level is defined as follows:
fux  S   fsx  O  and / or flx  O 

(2)

fly  S   fuy  O 

(3)

Where:
“⇒” means “access permitted”,
“  ” means “access denied”

Security Level Policy
Security levels of subjects and objects are
determined based on those of the existing MAC
models. Considering the military domain, they are
classified as Top secret, Secret, Confidential and
Unclassified (Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992; Sandhu et al.,
1996). Persons in charge of each of the four security
levels are described in Table 1. Objects can be files,
data, etc., but data is mainly targeted for the
consistency of expression here.

* Rule description: The security level of a specific
subject (S) means that only an object (O) at an equal
level and lower level can be accessed (2) but the object
can't access to higher level (3).
When a subject (S) having a specific task is defined
as a Subject in a certain task: St and an object (O)
corresponding to a specific task is defined as an Object
in certain task: Ot, the access permission of the security
level to the object of the specific task by the subject of
the specific task is defined as follows:
fux  Stn   fsx  Otn  and / or flx  Otn 

(4)

fly  Stn   fuy  Otn 

(5)

fuy  Stn   fsy  Otm  and / or fly  Otm 

(6)

Separation of Duties Policy
To secure effective internal control and maintain
confidentiality at each task level, tasks need to be
separated according to security levels, but it is also
necessary to segment access control based on the
separated tasks. A subject’s access authority to objects is
set by tasks based on the SoD policy. A subject, here,
means a user who uses an object (for instance, data).
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<<First-certification>>

User
+id: string
+password: string
+securitykey: string
+securityLevel: integer

Data

Certi_Id-Password

+filename: string

+requestIdCheck()

<<Security-certification>>

Certi_SecurityKey

securitykey_Delegation-Policy

+requestSecurityKeyCheck()

securitykey_Authorization-Policy

Securyty_Key

Subject

Object
+permit(id, securitykey)
+deny()

<<CBB Policy Model>>

Security_Level_Policy

Access_Control_Policy

Access_Control_List

+simpleSecurityProperty
+seperationOfDutiesProperty
+controltAccessToObjectHavingConfidentialityIntegrity()

Separation_of_Duties_Policy
+No-read/write-sibling_Policy()

- Support
confidentiality and
integrity

Data_Coloring_Policy

Access_Control_Matrix

- Solution of
policy collision

Fig. 7: Duties separation and data coloring-based MAC model for solving policy collision: DSDC-MAC
Table 1: Security level categories and persons in charge of
objects
Security level
Person in charge of object
Top Secret
Top-Level Administrators in the
organization
Secret
Middle Managers in the organization
Confidential
General Office Workers in the
organization
Unclassified
All Persons in the organization
(Non-Authorized Secret Handling)

Tasks need to be grouped into, first, super-categories
by their functions and, second, sub-categories within the
same super-category. Depending on the size and
characteristic of an organization, super-categories are
needed only in some cases and for large-sized
organizations, it will be necessary to segment tasks
further beyond the second-level sub-categories. If
necessary, more tasks can be added to sub-categories. Of
course, the more category levels are created, the more
difficulties the system faces. Table 2 shows the structure
of task categories and examples for the military domain.

Table 2: A 2-level task categorization scheme according to
SoD policy and an example
Super category
Sub category
(a) categorization scheme
Task #1
subTask #1_1
Task #2
subTask #1_2
Task #3
:
Task #4
subTask #2_1
:
:
Task #n
subTask #n_m
(b) Categorization example
Affairs
Administration, affairs plans
Intelligence
Security, intelligence analysis
Operations
Ops plans, current ops, future ops
Logistics
Logistics plans, supply, maintenance,
transportation
ICT
ICT plans, operations, information security

Data Coloring Policy
To Data coloring is a concept that was first
developed to add identifiers to the confidentiality levels
of data. Colors are assigned to data to allow users to
intuitively recognize the confidentiality levels of data.
It is possible to distinguish the levels simply by using
arrays of numbers or levels as identifiers, but there is
still ambiguity over how the criteria of identifiers
should be set to distinguish confidentiality levels.
However, it is possible to conveniently set criteria for
confidentiality levels by applying the RGB coloring
classification scheme suggested in this study. It is also
possible to designate more segmented identifiers within
each of the R, G and B groups.
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Red, Green and Blue (RGB) colors are expressed as
hexadecimal codes on a web page. Color values are
specified as three pairs of two-digit hexadecimal values
representing red, green and blue. When creating webbased colors, such hexadecimal notations are used and
they start with a special symbol (#). The structure of
color notations is shown in Table 3.
Around 16 million colors can be created through the
256 levels of RGB combinations. This can be utilized as
a very systematic classification method using the webbased color notations above.
Table 4 shows security colors that are defined by
wrapping the security levels of data (Table 1) with RGB
colors. For instance, “red” color is assigned to “top
secret” data, creating a security color, “SC_R”
(SecurityColor_Red). General data categorized as
“unclassified” are actually not the target objects of
protection and thus they are excluded here and even from
security keys later. Based on Table 1, security colors in
Table 4 represent security levels of subjects and objects.

Rule 4: (Assigning Detailed Color Codes to Category
Levels of Each Task)
The first two digits “nn” within color codes
(excluding FF) are identifiers for super-category tasks
and the second two digits “mm” are those for subcategory tasks. With these segmented task identifiers,
access can be controlled specifically.
Examples to assign color codes based on Rule 4 are
as shown in Table 6.

Subjects Subject-Object
Security Keys

To provide segmented access controls, color codes are
given to objects and subjects. Access can be controlled
through the mechanism of matching the same color codes.
In other words, individual security colors of subjects and
objects (Table 4) are further segmented into color values
by separating tasks (super- and sub-category tasks). Their
color values are defined (Table 3) and individual
identifiers of access authority are given as shown in Table
5. With these color codes, it is possible to easily identify
security levels and tasks of subjects and objects and their
access authority can be segmented by tasks. Codes shaded
in gray are highlighted for convenience to intuitively
recognize the colors of classified identifiers and thus they
have nothing to do with the titles of identifiers. The color
codes by tasks in Table 5 are generated based on the
Rules 3 and 4 and the rule in Table 6.
Security colors are given to each security level and
task and the rules for identification are as shown in Rules
3 and 4. The color values of security levels and tasks are
as follows:

Definition of Security Key
As shown in Fig. 9, security key is an essential
medium that links subjects and objects at certain
security levels based on proper rules (formulas 7~21
below). This serves as a dual-lock tool for the
additional authorization of users along with the
ID/PW method. In other words, security key is a
means to ensure users access objects (data) allowed to
them according to their security levels. This can be
realized using methods like One Time Password
(OTP). In order to provide security policies on access
control using security keys, those keys should be
matched with colors of security levels in Table 5 and
by doing so, access of subjects (users) to objects
(data) can be controlled. Based on the rules to control
access authority (formulas 17~21), certain access
authority is granted to users when the security colors of
their security keys are the same as or higher than their
level within the same task category.

SC_R: #FF0000, SC_G: #00FF00, SC_B: #0000FF
Codes

Using

Figure 8 shows the matching process of color codes
assigned to subjects and objects. Through the
ID/Password authorization of users, their preauthorized security level and SoD category (task) are
identified. Objects are data that belong to higher and
lower tasks stored within the database table and
schema. Tasks can be matched with subjects through
keys or attributes that have color code values. Security
keys between subjects and objects are tools to verify
the security levels and SoD that were pre-authorized
and assigned to subjects. When an authorized subject
wants to authorize additional security keys, authority is
granted to the user to access objects matched with the
authorized security levels and duties.

Subjects and Objects Matching by using Color and
Task (Duties)

Color

by

Process of Subject-Object Matching

DSDC Access Control Technique based on SoD
and Data Coloring

Rule 3: (Assigning RGB Basic
Individual Security Levels)

Matching

to

Subject-Object Matching by Using Security Key
Table 7 shows how subject, security key and object
can be matched by security levels using data coloring.
Here, the security levels of the keys are defined using a
data coloring technique and the abbreviation of
‘SK_(color of a certain level)’ is used for security key.

Web-based colors are identified by the location of
“FF” within 6-digit color codes and security levels are
basically classified based on this. If “FF” comes in the
1st and 2nd digits, this means red; in the 3rd and 4th
digits, green; and in the 5th and 6th digits, blue.
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Matching

Pre-approved # Color code
security level and
SoD category(task)

Matching

# Color code Authentication # Color code
value of security
color and task

ID/password
authentication

Security key
authentication

*Has the information of
authorized/assigned security key

*Has the information of authorized
security color and key

Subject

Security key

Security color and task =# color code

# Color code Key of attribute
*Has the security
color value

Task
Data

Super-category
sub-category

Table and schema of database
Object

Fig. 8: Process of subject and object matching

SC of subjects (users)

1

1

Security
keys labled
SC

1

1

SC of objects (data)

Fig. 9: Relationship among subject, security key and object
Table 3: Web-based RGB color notation
Special symbol
Red channel
#
00 ~ FF

Green channel
00 ~ FF

Table 4: Security colors policy defined by wrapping security levels with colors
Security level
Color
Top secret
Red
Secret
Green
Confidential
Blue
Unclassified
Black
Table 5: Detailed security levels and color relation
SoD-applied security level
Color code of super category task
SC_R_t
#1: #FFAA00
#2: #FFBB00
#3: #FFCC00
#4: #FFDD00
#5: #FFEE00
:
SC_G_t
#1: #AAFF00
#2: #BBFF00
#3: #CCFF00
#4: #DDFF00
#5: #EEFF00
:
SC_B_t
#1: #AA00FF
#2: #BB00FF
#3: #CC00FF
#4: #DD00FF
#5: #EE00FF
:
[Legend] t: Task category
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Blue channel
00 ~ FF

Security color
SC_R(Red)
SC_G(Green)
SC_B(Blue)
-

Color code of sub-category task
#1_1: #FFAA11
#1_2: #FFAA22
:
#2_1: #FFBB11
:
#3_1: #FFCC11
#1_1: #AAFF11
#1_2: #AAFF22
:
#2_1: #BBFF11
:
#3_1: #CCFF11
#1_1: #AA11FF
#1_2: #AA22FF
:
#2_1: #BB11FF
:
#3_1: #CC11FF
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Table 6: Rules and examples of super- and sub-category color codes of each task
① Color code example of super-category
② Color code example of sub-category
SC_R_tn : #FFnn00
SC_R_tn_m : #FFnnmm
SC_G_tn : #nnFF00
SC_G_tn_m : #nnFFmm
SC_B_tn : #nn00FF
SC_B_tn_m : #nnmmFF
SC_R_t1 : #FFAA00
SC_R_t1_1 : #FFAA11
SC_G_t1 : #AAFF00
SC_G_t1_1 : #AAFF11
SC_B_t1 : #AA00FF
SC_B_t1_1 : #AA11FF
* n, m: Integer (1~n,m), n, m: hexadecimal (0~E/excluding 'F')
** Excluding 'F' in hexadecimal values is to avoid collision with the color level identifier, "FF".
Table 7: Matching among subject, security key and object using data coloring
Subject
SC_level of subject
Security_Key
Top_level administrator
SC_R
SK_R
Middle manager
SC_G
SK_G
General office worker
SC_B
SK_B

SC_level of object
SC_R
SC_G
SC_B

Table 8: Matching among subject, security key and object using SoD and data coloring
Subject
SC_level of subject
Security_Key
SC_level of object
Top_level administrator
SC_R_t
SK_R_t
SC_R_t
Middle manager
SC_G_t
SK_G_t
SC_G_t
General office worker
SC_B_t
SK_B_t
SC_B_t

*SCR  SC_R, SCG  SC_G , SCB  SC_B

Object
Top secret data
Secret data
Confidential data

m
n
 l

SK   SK RTi  SKGTj  SK BTk   l , m, n : Positive integer  (13)
 i 1

j 1
k 1

The relationship among security color, security key
and subject (user) is as follows:
SC  SC R , SCG , SC B 

Object
Top secret data
Secret data
Confidential data

(7)

SK R 

n

SK RTi

(14)

SKGTi

(15)

SK BTi

(16)

i 1

SK  SK R , SK G , SK B 
*SK R  SK_R, SK G  SK_G , SK B  SK_B

(8)

SKG 

n
i 1

 l
SK   SK Ri 
 i 1
n
i 1

SK i 

m

SKGj 

j 1


SK Bk   l , m, n : Positive integer  (9)

k 1
n

SK B 

i 1

n

Userj

Authority-Based Access Control

(10)

j 1

Authority-Based Policy Definition

Subject, object (Table 5) and security key (Table 7)
are classified with colors respectively and identified with
color codes. 'L, m, n' in Formula 9 is determined by the
number of subjects in each security level. Table 8 shows
the mutual matching mechanism among subject, security
key and object with tasks (SoD) added to Table 7.
SoD and data coloring are added to formulas (7), (8),
(9) and (10) on security level above and the relationship
among security color, security key and user can be
defined as follows:
SC  SCRT , SCGT , SCBT 
*SCRT  SC_R_t , SCGT  SC_G_t , SCBT  SC_B_t
SK  SK RT , SK GT , SK BT 
*SK RT  SK_R_t , SK GT  SK_G_t , SK BT  SK_B_t

n

For further segmented access controls, the access
authority of subjects, of which tasks are separated by
security levels, to objects should have more detailed
rules for access based on the security policy of Rules 1
and 2 as follows. Depending on the characteristics of
organizations, their tasks may need to have only onelevel classification (super-category only). In this case,
access authority can be assigned based on Rule 5. If the
tasks need to be classified into two-level categories
(supper- and sub-category), Rule 6 can be applied. Rule
7 is applied to assign or delegate access authority within
the same task level.

(11)

Rule 5: Assigning Access Authority to Super-Category
Tasks
(12)

S: SC_tn ⇒ O: ≚ SC_tn{p}
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* Description: A subject that is classified to a certain
security level and super-category and certified as SC_tn
is given (⇒) access authority{permission} to objects
below (≚) its relevant security level within its supercategory task.

S: SC_R_tn
O: SC_R_tm{e, r, a, w},
O: SC_G_tm{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w}
S: SC_R_tn+m ⇒O: SC_R_tn{e, r, a, w},
O: SC_G_tn{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_B_tn{e, r, a, w},
O: SC_R_tm{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_G_tm{e, r, a, w},
O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w}

* Policy specifications under Rule 5
S: SC_R_tn ⇒ O: SC_R_tn{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_G_tn{e, r,
a, w}, O: SC_B_tn{e, r, a, w}
S: SC_G_tn ⇒ O: SC_G_tn{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_B_tn{e, r,
a, w}
S: SC_B_tn ⇒ O: SC_B_tn{e, r, a, w}
S: ∧SC ⇒ O: SC_K{e, r, a, w}
* S = Subject, O = Object, p = policy
K = Black Color (meaning Unclassified level),
e = executing, r = reading, a = appending, w =
writing

S: SC_G_tn

O: SC_G_tm{e, r, a, w},
O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w}
S: SC_G_tn+m ⇒ O: SC_G_tn{e, r, a, w},
O: SC_B_tn{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_G_tm{e, r, a, w},
O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w}
S: SC_B_tn
O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w}
S: SC_B_tn+m ⇒ O: SC_B_tn{e, r, a, w},
O: SC_B_tm{e, r, a, w}
Rule 8: Assigning and delegating access authority
according to a super and sub-category tasks
within the same security level (Optional rule)

Rule 6: Assigning access authority to the sub-category
tasks
S: SC_tn_m ⇒ O: ≚SC_tn_m{p}

S : SC _ tn  O : SC _ tn _ i  p ,i  1 ~ m, where n  m

(18)

(21)

* Description: A subject that is classified to a supercategory of a certain security level and certified as SC_tn
is given access authority to objects that are classified as
sub-category tasks under the super-category task at the
security level. However, this rule can be applied when
there is a need to restrict access to specific subordinate
functions to those who have authority of specific higher
level tasks according to the confidential classification
policy of the organization.

* Description: A subject that is classified to a certain
security level and sub-category task and certified as
SC_tn_m is given access authority to objects below its
relevant security level within its sub-category task.
* Policy specifications under Rule 6
S: SC_R_tn_m ⇒O: SC_R_tn_m{e, r, a, w}, O:
SC_G_tn_m{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_B_tn_m{e, r, a, w}
S: SC_G_tn_m ⇒O: SC_G_tn_m{e, r, a, w}, O:
SC_B_tn_m{e, r, a, w}
S: SC_B_tn_m ⇒O: SC_B_tn_m{e, r, a, w}

S : SC _ tn  O : SC _ tm

(19)

* Policy specifications under Rule 8
S: SC_R_tn ⇒ O: SC_R_tn_i {e, r, a, w}, {i = 1~m,
where n ≠ m}
S: SC_G_tn ⇒ O: SC_G_tn_i {e, r, a, w}, {i = 1~m,
where n ≠ m}
S: SC_B_tn ⇒ O: SC_B_tn_i {e, r, a, w}, {i = 1~m,
where n ≠ m}

S: SC_tn+m ⇒ O: ≚SC_tm{p}

(20)

Authority-based Access Control

Rule 7: Assigning and delegating access authority
within the same security level

The relationship among subject, security key and
object classified under the SoD principle and security
levels is shown in Fig. 10. The figure also shows
examples of access attempts that are not allowed under
their respective access authority. Access attempts ②, ③
and ④ (except ①) are blocked under Rules 1-2 and 5-6.
In the case of attempt ①, a subject at the Secret level
within Task #2 accesses an object within the same task
category with a valid security key. Attempts ②, ③ and
④, however, try to reach objects out of their task
categories and thus their access is blocked under the
access control policy.

* Description: A subject that is classified to a
certain task authority level of a certain security level
and certified as SC_tn is not allowed to access objects at
the same security level in other tasks. Only when
access authority to other tasks is additionally delegated
to it, to put it another way, when a subject certified as
SC_tn+m is additionally given a delegated access
authority (tm) other than its original task (tn), the
subject is allowed to access objects below the security
level of tm within the task category.
* Policy specifications under Rule 7
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Fig. 10: Categories of and relationship between subject, security key and object

However, Attempts ② and ③ are to access
objects out of their task categories and thus they are
blocked under the access control policy. Attempt ④
is allowed if it is the “No –write-down” Policy of the
BLP model and the “No-read-down” Policy of Biba
model, but it is blocked under the policy of the CBB
model suggested in this study.

Human Resources Management System (HRMS)
The suggested DSDC-MAC model was applied to a
Human Resources Management System (HRMS) to verify
its reliability. The HRMS handles sensitive personnel
information such as social identification, contact number,
passport information, HR history, work performance,
annual salary, etc. Since such information needs to be
classified by task areas and security levels, it is suitable to
apply the DSDC-MAC model to this system.
Figure 11 shows general task areas of the HRMS
including employment management, HR operation/
management, absence control, performance evaluation
management and payment management. Under the 5
super-categories of tasks, sub-categories are classified
respectively and further detailed data are also included.

Authority Delegation (Security Key Delegation)
Authority delegation can be executed only by
subjects who have security keys to objects at certain
levels. A subject who has access authority to certain data
under the SoD principle is able to delegate the authority
to unauthorized subjects at the same level (meaning
sibling subjects in separately classified tasks) and other
subjects at higher levels in other tasks.
In delegating authority, the policies defined in
“Complementary BLP and Biba policy” section should
not be violated. If a subject receives a request to permit
authority delegation from those at the same level or higher
levels, the subject should delegate its security keys to
them after checking whether there is any violation of the
defined policies or not. The results of delegation, as data
to identify relevant subjects, objects and delegated
security keys, is sent to and saved at a repository for
access control policies and utilized as data for review.

DSDC-MAC-based HRMS Access Control Model
Domain Task Category and Security Leveling of
HRMS
First, tasks are separated and data security levels are
determined. The areas of the separated tasks are defined
based on the SoD classification in Table 2 (chapter 3)
and the HRMS task categories in Fig. 11. In order to set
security levels on data units in detail, data groups are
included in the sub-category classification. Data security
levels are set using the security levels in Table 1. The
items shown in Table 9, except the subject and object
columns, define task categories and security levels. For
instance, “Candidate Information” is a sub-task of the
super-category “Employment Management,” and “n1)
Contact No.” in the Task and Data item under the subcategory is the sub-data group of “Candidate
Information.” The detailed data under the group is
classified as “Confidential,” and thus only those in
charge of the task are allowed to access the data.

Case Study
This chapter shows an application cases by applying
the proposed method to the Human Resources
management System (HRMS). As a case study, the
example case of handling confidential information due
to the characteristics of the MAC model is desirable,
but it is difficult because it includes sensitive data
related to military agency.
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Information” task which is one of the sub-category tasks
of the super-category task, “Human Resources Operation
Management,” and who at the same time have access
authority to Top Secret. If necessary, data can be entered
or altered by others through authority delegation.

Separation of Duties by Subject and Object of HRMS
Subjects and objects are linked to the HRMS task
categories and data defined above as shown in Table 9.
In particular, subjects are divided into worker and
manager in charge of each task (department) and vice
president or president who has higher responsibility.
Generally, the higher work position, the higher
responsibility. Persons at higher-level positions tend to
have higher security levels. Thus, worker is given the
3rd-grade security level (Confidential) and manager, the
2nd-grade security level (Secret). More sensitive
information is classified as the 1st-grade security level
(Top secret) and president or vice president is given the
security level. In particular, “n2) Social ID No.” in Table
9 is very sensitive data and thus its security level is
classified as “Top Secret” to ensure that the information
is controlled by the highest-level manager. Subjects who
can access the data are limited to “Vice President.”
In other words, the data can be accessed only by
subjects who are allowed to handle the “Personal

Data Coloring of HRMS Objects
A data coloring technique is applied to the subjects
and objects (Table 9) of the HRMS defined by tasks
above and Table 10 shows the results. Security colors by
security levels are mapped based on Rule 3 and Table 4
and those by task categories are mapped based on Rule 4
and Table 5. “Personal Information” is one of the subtasks of the super-category “Human Resources
Operation Management,” and “n3) Contact No.” in Table
10 is one of the sub-data groups under Personal
Information. The security level of the detailed data is set
as “Confidential” to ensure that they can be accessed by
only persons in charge of the task. Under Rules 3 and 4,
identifiers (RGB color codes) are also given to the data
using the data coloring technique.

Human resources
operation management

Employment management

Absence control

Personal info.
management

Candidate info.
management

Absence result
management

Name

Level result
management

Name
Social ID no.
Contact no.

Candidate no.

Performance evaluation
management

Address
Contact no.

Education level

Work performance
management

Name

Address

Evaluation level
management

Social ID no.
Career

Contact no.
Payment management

Address

Employment result
management

Education level
Salary management
Personal record
management

Annual salary
management

Promotion record
management

Severance pay
management

Education record
management
[Legend]

Super category,

Fig. 11: HRMS task categories
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Table 9: Definition of the subjects and objects by HRMS task categories
Sub category
Super category
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Task category
Task
Task Category Task and data
Identifier
Subject
Object
Security Level
Task #1
Employment
subTask #1_1
Candidate Info.
t_1_10
Manager
Management
Data #1
Name
t_1_11
Worker
Marco,
Data #2
Candidate No.
t_1_12
Worker
Lee
Unclassified
Data #3
n1) Contact No.
t_1_13
Worker
C.101
Unclassified
010-205-0011
Confidential
Task #2
Human resources
subTask #2_1
Personal Info.
t_2_10
Manager
operation management
Data #1
Name
t_2_11
Worker
John,
Data #2
n2) Social ID No.
t_2_12
Vice.President
Song
Unclassified
Data #3
Contact No.
t_2_13
Worker
54602-14560
Top Secret
010-303-1100
Confidential
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Table 10: Applying data coloring to the subjects and objects of HRMS task categories
Sub category
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Task category
Task
Identifier
Subject
Object
Security level
subTask #1
Candidate Info.
t_1_10
Manager
Data #1
Name
t_1_11
Worker
Marco, Lee
Unclassified
Data #2
Candidate No.
t_1_12
Worker
C.101
Unclassified
Data #3
Contact No.
t_1_13
Worker
010-205-0011
Confidential
subTask #1
Data #1
Data #2

Personal Info.
Name
Social ID No.

t_2_10
t_2_11
t_2_12

Manager
Worker
Vice.President

John, Song
54602-14560

Unclassified
Top Secret

Data #3

n3) Contact No.

t_2_13

Worker

010-303-1100

Confidential

:

:

:

:
:
:
* K: Black (Unclassified data) (Table 4)

Table 11: Definition of security keys of subjects for accessing objects in HRMS
Task
Subject
Security level
Total managing
CEO
Top secret
Vice CEO
Top secret
Employment
Employment manager
Secret
management
Employment office worker
Confidential
HRO management
HRO manager
Secret
HRO office worker
Confidential

Definition of Security Keys of Subjects for
Accessing HRMS Objects

Data coloring
SC_R_t1+2+3+4+5
SC_R_t1+2+3+4+5
SC_G_t1
SC_B_t1
SC_G_t2
SC_B_t2

Applying data coloring
(RGB Color code)
K
K
SC_B_t1_13
(#AA30FF)
K
SC_R_t2_12
(#FFBB20)
SC_B_t2_13
(#BB30FF)
:

Security key
SK_R_t1+2+3+4+5
SK_R_t1+2+3+4+5
SK_G_t1
n4) SK_B_t1
SK_G_t2
SK_B_t2

Authority-Based HRMS Policy Definition
Based on the subject, object and security key defined
above, access authority policies for the HRMS can be
defined under Rules 5-7 as follows:

Table 11 shows the HRMS security keys for each
object to access objects and they are defined based on
Table 7 and 8 and formulas 7~16 using data coloring and
SoD. “n4) SK_B_t1” in Table 11 is defined as the
security key that has access authority both to t1, the
identifier of the supper-category task called
“Employment Management,” and objects classified as
the 3rd-grade security level (Confidential). This security
key is granted only to users at the related security level
in the same task category, that is, “Employment office
worker.” Here, the security key is a means to identify
subjects and objects when subjects try to access objects
that they are allowed to do so. This can be also used as a
tool to authorize subjects, allowing them to validly
access to objects according to the defined rules.

S: SC_t1⇒O: ≚SC_t1{p}
S: SC_R_t1⇒O: SC_R_t1{e, r, a, w},
O: SC_G_t1{e, r, a, w}, O: SC_B_t1{e, r, a, w}
S: SC_G_t1⇒O: SC_G_t1{e, r, a, w},
O: SC_B_t1{e, r, a, w}
S: SC_B_t1⇒O: SC_B_t1{e, r, a, w}
S: ∧SC ⇒ O: SC_K{e, r, a, w}
The policies above stipulate that subjects who have
access authority to Task#1 (Employment Management)
are allowed to access data below the security level. In
other words, subjects who have the Red security level
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(1st-grade/Top Secret) in Task#1 can access data
classified as 1st, 2nd and 3rd grades as well as generallevel data within the relevant task category.
Such access policies above define all the individual task
categories and under task categories, subjects, objects and
security keys are linked and defined accordingly.

capable of “write” and “read” at the same level, which
makes it possible to read or modify secrets irrelevant to
the job, which leads to problems of confidentiality and
integrity. On the other hand, the proposed DSDC-MAC
model can solve above problems.

Evaluation

The DSDC-MAC model is evaluated in comparison
with other MAC models, including BLP, Biba and
Lattice-based access control model as shown in Table
12. The proposed model was compared with existing
studies mainly from two aspects, including
confidentiality/ integrity and model design.
From the confidentiality and integrity aspect, more
detailed classification on subjects and objects was
required to support these features. Compared with earlier
studies, it is basically possible to classify subjects and
objects in detail according to security levels in the BLP,
Biba and lattice-based models. Those models, however,
failed to classify the items further as the proposed model
in this study did by applying the SoD principle.
Especially, coupled with the method of security
keys, this model provides dual-lock access control tools
unlike other models. For flexibility, the proposed
model allows authorized users with security keys can
delegate their authority to sibling subjects in other task
categories and those at higher levels. Using the access
control policy repository, the results of the requests and
approvals for authority delegation can be used for
review later afterwards.
In addition, the BLP model emphasizes confidentiality
and the Biba model emphasizes integrity respectively.
Thus, these models did not meet confidentiality and
integrity at the same time. On the other hand, the Lattice
model has been shown to be mathematically acceptable
within one Lattice to solve the limitations of the security
policies of the BLP and Biba models. Therefore, the
Lattice model appears to support both confidentiality and
integrity simultaneously.

Comparative Evaluation with the Existing Methods

In this section, it focus the primary characteristics of
the access control model, compare the proposed model
with the legacy MAC models and discuss the
characteristics and limitations of the proposed model.

Discussion on the Access Control Policies with
Case Study
Looking at the HRMS case and access control
policies of the DSDC-MAC model, the Employee
manager with green authority of task classification t1 has
authority to read and write about the 3nd grade data as
well as 2nd grade of t1. However, T2's 2nd grade
(Green) secrets, which can only be accessed by HRO
Managers of the same class, are not accessible under the
separation of duties policy. In addition, Employment
office workers with t1 (blue) authority with the same
task are not authorized to read, write, or access 2nd
grade (Green) secrets. This indicates that a low level of
confidentiality can improve the confidentiality and
integrity by not being able to read or write higher level
secrets. Moreover, even if a subject has the same level of
authority, if the job is different, it can further ensure
confidentiality and integrity so that it cannot be read or
written. However, in case of legacy BLP and Biba
model, there has problems as follows. If it is BLP model,
Employment Office Worker of 3nd grade (Blue Level)
cannot read “Green” Data of 2nd grade, but “Write” is
possible, so there is integrity problem. In the Biba
model, Employment office workers cannot "write" data
of 2nd grade, but "read" is possible, which is a
confidentiality problem. Furthermore, both models are
Table 12: Evaluation with current MAC models

Assessed items
Confidentiality
and integrity

BLP model
(Bell and
LaPadula, 1975)

Detailed classification method
of subjects and objects
△
Supporting SoD policy
×
Simultaneously supporting
confidentiality and integrity
×
Dual-lock access control
×
Supporting authority delegation
(Access control flexibility)
×
Supporting function to review task performance
×
Model design
Offering identifiers of subjects and objects
×
Supporting strict authorization process
×
Secure key management
×
Offering case study or implementation model
△
[Legend] ○: applicable/supported, △: partially applicable/supported, ×: not applicable/supported
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Biba model
(Biba, 1997)

Lattice model
(Sandhu, 1993;
Denning, 1976)

Proposed
model

△
×

△
×

○
○

×
×

○
×

○
○

×
×
×
×
×
△

×
×
×
×
×
△

○
△
○
○
○
○
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From the aspect of model design, no suggestion was
found in earlier studies on identifiers of subjects and
objects. In this study, however, accurate identifiers were
presented using a data coloring technique. In addition,
other studies have not supported strict authorization and
secure key management.
Furthermore, other legacy studies did not have
specific case studies or implementation models and were
only described as illustrative levels. However, this study
presented a case study through HRMS system.

Characteristics and Limitations
The main features of the proposed DSDC-MAC
model and policies are as follows:










Conclusion
This study suggested a DSDC-MAC model and
security policies that can improve both the
confidentiality and integrity of MAC models such as
BLP and Biba using SoD and data coloring techniques.
Based on the policies of the proposed model, tasks of
subjects and objects were classified and security colors
were given to each of the classified subjects according to
their security levels. The colors were matched with
security keys to prevent or allow subjects to access
objects (or data). By applying the principle of SoD-based
access control, ambiguity in access control within the
same security level was removed. It was possible to
segment security and access controls for subjects and
objects using a data coloring technique. Collisions
between security policies can be prevented by
simultaneously supporting confidentiality and integrity
based on MAC models. In addition, it becomes convenient
to identify data security levels and manage access control
by assigning security colors to individual task data. At
the same time, it is possible to provide dual-lock access
control along with security keys. The model can be
applied to the design and construction of an organization's
internal systems or organizations that deal with a lot of
confidential information, such as the military or
intelligence agencies that only provide specific
information to specific personnel. In particular, it will be
an effective countermeasure against insider threats.
The Complementary BLP and Biba (CBB) security
policies in the suggested model need to be further
specified using an access control language in a follow-up
study. The efficiency and usability of the proposed
model should be analyzed further by applying it to
settings such as object-oriented DB. Furthermore, it will
be also necessary to implement a DBMS system
equipped with the security structure of such databases. In
addition, the present model has been studied to ensure
confidentiality and integrity at the same time, but does
not consider availability, one of the third triad of
security. Therefore, in the system implementation stage
applying the proposed model, it is necessary to conduct
research so that a valid licensee has no restriction on
service use in consideration of 'availability'. In addition,
a study on both the implementation of the security key

SoD-driven access control
While earlier studies use a vertical method for
access control based on security levels (Top
Secret/Secret/Confidential/Unclassified)
only,
access control can be further segmented horizontally
even within the same security level based on tasks in
the proposed model
Security color-focused access control
The proposed model support identifiers of data by
security levels and task categories using data
coloring, providing object-oriented access control
based on security colors
Mapping subjects and objects based on security keys
The proposed model guarantees subjects dual-lock
authorization tools using security keys. With
security colors and keys, subjects and objects can be
identified and their access can be controlled, thus
supporting dual-lock security control
Complementary BLP and Biba (CBB) model policy
By suggesting a new CBB policy model, the
proposed model can address contra diction issues
associated with confidentiality and integrity that are
found in the BLP and Biba models. With this
mechanism, security can be further improved
In addition to complementing confidentiality and
integrity policies by Data Coloring and Separation
of Duty, this study provides one of the contributions
to provide dual-lock access control through Security
Key. However, it did not examine in detail the
implementation method of optimized security key
and
only
mentioned
that
security
key
implementation such as OTP is possible. Thus,
further follow-up studies are needed

The followings are some potential limitations found
in the proposed model:


The proposed model has to be implemented or built
in existing DBMS systems
To implement the results of this study in real
settings, it is essential to apply them in
commercialized DBMS systems, but there is some
difficulty in implementing it in reality. It was
difficult to apply key modules suggested in this
study to commercialized products such as Oracle
and more time and efforts should be put into
applying them to open source DBMS systems. More
optimized methods to implement security keys in
reality should be also suggested

The
proposed
model
lacks
standardized
specifications on the security policies using SPL.
(Access Control Language for Security Policy)

89

Soon-Book Lee et al. / Journal of Computer Science 2020, 16 (1): 72.91
DOI: 10.3844/jcssp.2020.72.91

optimized for the presented model and also the
complexity analysis of the proposed approach method is
required. Based on these future studies, a practical case
study is needed to verify the applicability of the
proposed model to specific institutions.
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